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An important stylized fact to emerge from the VAR estimates is that
exogenous monetary policy shocks (also labelled unsystematic monetary
policy) have a delayed, persistent, hump shaped e⁄ect on in￿ ation. I argue
that this empirical pattern is fragile. In particular it disappears when
one corrects for the e⁄ects of large shifts (breaks) in average in￿ ation or
examines periods without such shifts (such as the 1984-2004 period). An
important consequence is that the hump shaped VAR estimated response
of in￿ ation is not appropriate to ￿t stylised models of the response of
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Non technical summary 
One of the most widely accepted stylised facts of monetary economics is that US 
inflation has a hump shape response to exogenous monetary policy shocks. This 
stylised fact is supported by a series of robustness checks along several dimensions. It 
is robust to a series of alteration of the identification of monetary policy shocks, i.e.  
whether one assumes that the Federal Reserve fix the short term interest rate as a 
function of only inflation and economic activity or that the level of interest rate that is 
relevant to measure the stance of monetary policy depends also on monetary 
aggregates, long term interest rates, commodity prices and indicators of demand for 
liquidity in the inter-bank market. 
However, this characterisation of the effects of unsystematic monetary policy on 
inflation is very sensitive to the choice of the sample period on which the econometric 
model of monetary policy decisions is estimated. In particular, if one considers the 
last twenty years, estimated monetary policy shocks have no effect of inflation, nor 
the price level. The hump shaped response of inflation is obtained only if either the 
building up or the collapse of the 1970 Great Inflation is included in the sample over 
which the model is estimated.  
One important implication is that models that are consistent with the evidence 
estimated over long sample periods may be mixing up the response of inflation to 
monetary policy shocks in periods of large adjustments of inflation, such as the so-
called Volker disinflation, and periods when the mean of inflation is stable, e.g, from 
1984 until 2004. There is therefore a risk that these models provide a poor 
approximation of inflation dynamics for both periods of large adjustments and periods 
when the mean of inflation is stable. 
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leads to a delayed and gradual fall in in￿ation￿ .
This stylised fact is supported by a series of robustness checks along sev-
eral dimensions, though all within the VAR framework, reported in the second
chapter of the 1999 Handbood of Macroeconomics: ￿Monetary Policy Shocks,
What have we learned and to what hand?￿(also by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 1999a; thereafter CEE-99a) and in many contributions reviewed therein.
However, this VAR based characterisation of the e⁄ects of unsystematic
monetary policy1 on in￿ ation is very sensitive to the choice of the sample period.
In particular, if one considers the last twenty years, VAR estimated monetary
policy shocks have no e⁄ect of in￿ ation, nor the price level. The hump shaped
response of in￿ ation is obtained only if either the building up or the collapse
of the 1970 Great In￿ ation is included in the sample over which the VAR is
estimated.
One important implication is that models that are consistent with
evidence estimated over long sample periods may be mixing up the response
of in￿ ation to monetary policy shocks in periods of large adjustments of in￿ ation,
such as the so-called Volker disin￿ ation, and periods when the mean of in￿ ation
is stable, e.g, from 1984 till 2004. There is therefore a risk that these models
provide a poor approximation of in￿ ation dynamics for both periods of large
adjustments and periods when the mean of in￿ ation is stable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows that VAR identi￿cations of
monetary policy shocks, estimates of the in￿ ation and the price level impulse
responses based on the 1984-2004 are radically di⁄erent from the ones obtained
for the full last 45 years. Section 3 shows that the standard result is largely due
to a few discrete changes in the mean of in￿ ation. Section 4 concludes.
1Through out the text I refer indi⁄erently to either monetary policy shocks, exogenous
monetary policy shocks or unsystematic monetary policy.
1 Introduction
One of the most widely accepted stylised facts of monetary economics is that
US in￿ ation has a hump shape response to exogenous monetary policy shocks.
For instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) state (page 5-8) ￿after
an expansionary monetary policy shock [...] in￿ation responds in a hump shape
fashion peaking after about two years￿ . Likewise Mankiw (2001) writes ￿Accord-
ing to the consensus view among central bankers and monetary economists, a
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the2 VAR based identi￿cation of US monetary pol-
icy
2.1 The identi￿cation of US monetary policy shocks
Two decades after the seminal contribution of Sims (1980), vector autoregres-
sions (VARs) have become the most widely used econometric apparatus to de-
scribe stylized facts on the e⁄ects of structural, i.e. economically meaningful,
shocks. In particular, the study of US monetary policy with VAR models has
developed as a literature of its own. CEE-99a, which is the second chapter of
the latest Handbook of Macroeconomics, is entirely dedicated to VAR based
identi￿cation of US monetary policy shocks and estimates of their e⁄ects on
US macroeconomic variables2. In their introduction, CEE-99a argue that US
monetary policy shocks are "good candidates" to evaluate the ability of models
to mimic actual economies. For instance, they showed in a earlier paper that
limited participation models and sticky price models predict di⁄erent path for
money and the interest rate following a monetary policy shock (CEE, 1999b).
One remarkable result of CEE-99a is that most competing identi￿cation
schemes of US monetary policy shocks deliver quite similar results in terms
of their e⁄ects on output and prices. A monetary policy tightening triggers a
hump shaped response of the GDP log-level and a negative response of the price
log-level that is gradual. This is true for both recursive identi￿cation, ￿ la Sims
non-recursive models, as well as across models that di⁄er in terms of the number
of variables entering the VAR, and therefore the information set on the basis of
which the central banks sets its instrument (usually assimilated to the interest
rate on Federal Funds).




which stand for dlog(GDP), dlog(CPI), dlog(Commodity prices), the interest
2The other two most cited surveys are Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Bernanke and
Mihov (1998).
rate on Federal Funds, dlog(Total R), dlog(NBR) and dlog(M1).3
3dlog stands for ￿st di⁄erence of the variables logarythm.
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are estimated in three steps. First, the variables are regressed on their lag values
to estimate the parameters of A(L), the autoregressive form of the model:
Yt = A(L)Yt￿1 + ut




0 ut with utu0
t = ￿ and "t"0
t = D where dij = 0 for i 6= j
Among these orthogonalized residuals "t, we consider that the one associ-
ated to the it equation captures the monetary policy structural shocks, i.e. we
call the fourth equation orthogonalized residual "
MonetaryPolicy
t . In substance,
"
MonetaryPolicy
t are the deviations of the monetary policy instrument from the
linear average reaction function to the variables of the VAR during the sample
period. The recursiveness of the CEE-99a identi￿cation amounts to assuming
that the central bank may react to current quarter observations of dyt;￿t;and
￿CP
t while it would, on average, not react to current quarter developments in
dTRt;dNBRt;dM1t.4
Third: we can then invert the estimated autoregressive model to obtain the
MA representation of Yt :
Yt = A(L)Yt￿1 + A0"t = (I ￿ A(L))￿1A0"t
= MA(1)"t
from which we compute the impulse responses reported in the Figures of the
paper.
4See Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and CEE-99 for a discussion of recursiveness in the
identi￿cation of US monetary policy shocks.
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1960-2005 sample
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of the main variables of interest in Yt
as well as the price level and the GDP level responses5. The picture matches
very well the one obtained with the same model estimated by CEE-99a on levels
directly for the 1960-2005 sample period6:
￿ The interest rate returns to baseline within 3 years after the initial shock;
￿ given that the initial responses of reserves and M1 is negative, "
MonetaryPolicy
t
can be interpreted as a money supply shock;
￿ the hump-shaped response of GDP is signi￿cant before GDP returns to
baseline;
￿ the response of in￿ ation is also humped and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. It picks noticeably after the pick of the GDP growth response.
A long list of alternative identi￿cations of US monetary policy shocks con-
￿rms these results7. What is even more remarkable is that these results are
widely agreed upon in the profession as describing the e⁄ects of unsystematic
(and in some case also systematic) US monetary policy. From leading Neo-
Keynesian academics (e.g. Mankiw, 2001) to RBC developers (e.g. Christianno,
5The observations are quarterly and each equation of the model is estimated with a con-
stant term and four lags. In all impulse response ￿gures, which are estimated with Rats 5,
the con￿dence bands correspond to the 10th and the 90th percentiles of 1000 Monte Carlo
replications of the model.
Through out the text we systemically report the response of the largest monetary aggregate
included in the model in order to check the interest rate shock corresponds to a money supply
shock.
6We simply use the largest set of available data for the estimation. We therefore start the
sample in 1960, which is the ￿rst observation of monetary aggregates that are consistent to
date.
7This is for instance the case for the alternative identi￿cation (Gordon and Leeper, 1994;
CEE, 2001; Giordani, 2004; and CEE-99 using monthly data) with which we check for the
robustness of our results. The description of these models is done in the appendix.
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2004; the Federal Reserve Board web site introduction on the transmission mech-
anism), "we economists" consider that monetary policy a⁄ects in￿ ation ￿rst by
a⁄ecting demand which eventually puts pressure on prices and wages. This con-
sensus view has also became a benchmark to model the transmission mechanism
of other OECD countries (Sims, 1992; Peersman and Smets; 2004; Mojon and
Peersman, 2003, Kim, 1997; Angeloni et al., 2003).
As a result, this pattern of impulse responses has become one of the tar-
gets for calibrating or estimating structural models (e.g. CEE, 2005; Altig et
al. 2004). As stressed in the introduction of CEE-99a, these models ought
to reproduce this "well measured in the data and well accepted" e⁄ects of US
monetary policy shocks.
2.3 The e⁄ects of monetary policy as estimated for the
post 1984 sample
Are the results presented in Figure 2 stable over time? In particular, there
are several good reasons for focusing on the post 1984 period. First, estimat-
ing models on sub-samples is a standard proceedure to check for robustness.
Moreover, the ongoing transformation of the economy (e.g. the spreading of in-
formation technology) suggests that policy maker should give more prominence
to the more recent evidence on macroeconomic adjustments. Second, several
economists have provided evicence of structural breaks in the mid-1980s. Mc-
Connel and Perez-Quiros (2000) showed that the volatility of US output growth
admits a signi￿cant break in 1984. Turning to in￿ ation, the amplitude of its ￿ uc-
tuations have become an order of magnitude smaller than the one observed in
the 1970￿ s. Levin and Piger (2004) also argue that the mean and the persistence
of in￿ ation may have dropped after the Volker disin￿ ation was completed.
Third, there is also an active debate on the existence of the monetary pol-
icy regime shifts since the early 1960￿ s8. Clarida Gali and Gertler (2000) and
8Time series based analyses of monetary policy usually start in 1960 due to limited avail-
ability of monetary aggregate data prior to that date.
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anchored before the Volker-Greenspan era because the implicit reaction function
of the Federal reserve was, up to the late 1970￿ s accomodative of in￿ ationary
shocks. Sims and Zha (2005) and Primiceri (2005) showed that the implicit
reaction function of the Federal reserve appeared rather stable if changes in the
variance of monetary policy shocks is accounted for.9 However, both of these
contributions obtain that this variance was higher in the 1970￿ s than over the
last twenty years. Hence, estimation of constant parameters model is arguably
more legitimate in the recent "homoschedastic" sub-sample than for the full
sample. Finally, Goodfriend and King (2005) argue that it took Paul Volcker
several years to anchor in￿ ation expectations at lower levels than in the 1970￿ s.
The ￿rst years of the Federal Reserve under Volcker therefore correspond to an
"incredible disin￿ ation" where the dynamics of in￿ ation may not be similar to
the one that prevailed once the disin￿ ation was completed. For all these reasons,
looking at the e⁄ects of monetary policy as it can be estimated in the period
starting in 1984, i.e. after the Volker disin￿ ation is completed, seems warranted.
Figure 3 reports the impulse responses for exactly the same model as de-
scribed in the previous section but restricting the sample to the last two decades.
There are many similarites with the estimates based on the 1960-2005 sample.
In particular, the response of the interest rate, reserves and M1 validate that
we are describing a money supply shock. However, there are also two striking
di⁄erences:
1. The size of the monetary policy shocks is half smaller than for the full
sample period.
2. Neither the in￿ ation nor the price level responses are signi￿cant.
These results are actually robust across identi￿cations schemes representa-
tive of the most popular identi￿cations in the literature, including10:
9See also Hanson (2003).
10The exact de￿nition and source of the variables used in these models and the identi￿cation
procedure implemented for each of them are described in the appendix.
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production instead of GDP as an indicator or real activity and excluding
total reserves and non-borrowed reseres from the set of variables entering
the VAR.
￿ the Gordon and Leeper (1994) non recursive identi￿cation model;
￿ the CEE-01 model that on the contrary controls for many additional vari-
ables with respect to CEE-99a (real wage, productivity, pro￿ts and the
stock price);
￿ the Giordani (2004) model that contains only the capacity utilization,
in￿ ation and the FFR.
The impulse responses of the variable of interest are reported in the appendix
Figures A1 to A4.
The smaller scale of interest rate shocks with respect to the full sample result
is well documented (e.g. Primiceri 2005). The volatility of exogenous monetary
policy shocks was higher in the 1970￿ s and especially so in the 1979-1982 period
of strict monetary targeting under Paul Volker. Besides, the size of the shock
is irrelevant for VAR based impulse responses which are proportional to the
abritrary chosen size of the initial shock.
However, the other di⁄erence point to a markedly di⁄erent set of stylised
facts for the e⁄ects of exogenous monetary policy shocks on in￿ ation than the
one described in by Mankiw (2001), Christianno et al (1999a, 2005) and text-
books (e.g. Woodford, 2003). The response of in￿ ation ocsillates around zero.
Its cummulated e⁄ect on the price level is essentially ￿ at. This di⁄erence with
the 1960-2005 estimates should not be neglected. It makes a big di⁄erence,
both for the development of structural models and for the implementation of
monetary policy whether in a stable monetary policy regime such as the post
1984 sample, deviations from the reaction function of the central bank have an
e⁄ect on in￿ ation or not.
12
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of the in￿ ation response over the full sample period.
3 What is "wrong" with estimating VARs over
the 1960-2005 sample?
This section proposes a simple explanation of the contrast between the results
after 1984 and the ones reported in CEE-99a. By construction, the impulse re-
sponses based on standard VARs imposes constant parameters for the dynamics
of the variables through out the sample. This point has been criticized when
applied to the modelling of US monetary policy. Some, including Clarida et al
(2000) and Boivin and Gianonni (2002), argue that the reaction function of the
central bank has changed in the late 1970￿ s. Others, Sims and Zha (2005) and
Primiceri (2005) consider that these changes are not signi￿cant once controlling
for the time variation in the variance of the VAR shocks.
We show in this section that one parameter of the VAR has actually changed
signi￿cantly in addition to the change in the shocks￿variance. This parameter
is the intercept of the in￿ ation equation, i.e. the mean of in￿ ation. Once
controlling for these changes in the mean of in￿ ation, monetary policy shocks
do not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on in￿ ation, nor the price level.
3.1 Has the mean of US in￿ ation been stable?
Can we assume, as is implicit in VARs, that in￿ ation had a stable mean between
1960 to 2005? Not really. The US has experienced long term changes in the
level of in￿ ation. In￿ ation has risen in the late 1960s and again in the early
1970s before it declined sharply in the early 1980￿ s . Except for these three
episodes, in￿ ation seems to have ￿ uctuated around a stable mean (about 2.5
%) both before 1965 and after 1982 and clearly above that level in between.
This reading of Figure 1 can actually be tested using formal statistical tests on
breaks in the mean of US in￿ ation. These tests, which results are summarized
13
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1947.
I estimate the break dates by implementing the Altissimo-Corradi (2003)
procedure for both CPI in￿ ation and GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation. This break test
has the advantage that it allows for multiple breaks. In addition, results of
alternative tests (e.g. the Bai and Perron test) are already available in from
other papers (Benati 2003, 2004; Rapach and Wohar 2002; see also as well as
with the results of Levin and Piger 2004; and Gadzinski and Orlandi 2004,
although for a much shorter period than mine). My results therefore usefully
complement these already available tests.
Three break dates appear relatively robust11:
1. 1967 Q3 when the mean of CPI (GDP de￿ ator) in￿ ation increases by 2.5
% from 2.1 to 4.6 (from 2.0 to 4.5),
2. 1973 Q1 when the mean of CPI (GDP de￿ ator) in￿ ation increases by 2.8
% from 4.6 to 7.3 (by 4.0 from 4.5 to 8.5),
3. 1982 Q2 when the mean of CPI (GDP de￿ ator) in￿ ation decreases to 2.5
% (3.0 %).
These results are compared to the evidence reported in previous papers in
Table 1.
Two observations are in order. First, the timing of the breaks is probably
at odd with the prior of most economists who associate the 1970 great in￿ ation
to oil. The 1967 break in the mean of US in￿ ation occurs much earlier than the
￿rst oil shock. And the last one, in 1982, precedes the 1986 counter oil shock
by four years. We will nevertheless also investigate the e⁄ects of controlling for
the 1991 break on measures of the e⁄ects of monetary policy.
11We don￿ t ￿nd a break in the early 1990￿ s as Levin and Piger and Gadzinski and Orlandi
and one of Benati￿ s tests do. We also note that the last observations of the sample tend to
correct the downward shift that appears in the in￿ation time series between the early 1990￿ s
and the late 1990￿ s (see Figure 1).
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events in the US monetary policy history. To start with, the 1982 break marks
the success of the Volcker "Conquest of the Post War US in￿ ation". Cogley and
Sargent (2004) show that the US low frequency swings in in￿ ation are consistent
with the Federal Reserve gradually upgrading its view on the (im)possibility of
exploiting an output-in￿ ation trade o⁄. Clarida et al. (2000) conclude that
the major change in US in￿ ation, i.e. the Volcker disin￿ ation, coincide with
a change in the central bank￿ s reaction function from setting pro-cyclical real
interest rates to counter-cyclical ones.
Turning to the 1967 and the 1973 breaks, it appears that the persistent
mis-perception of the productivity trend in real time may have led the Fed-
eral Reserve to consistently under-estimated the neutral level of interest rates
(Orphanides, 1999).
I don￿ t think though that the results of these tests should be taken at face
value. Indeed, break tests tend, when applied to highly persistent processes, to
be subject to type II error (O￿ Reilly and Whelan, 2004), the estimated breaks
may be spurious. However, the presence of breaks in the in￿ ation time series in-
dicates that the adjustment of in￿ ation may be discontinuous. "Normal times",
when in￿ ation adjusts around a stable mean sharply contrast with times of shifts
in the mean. This contrast raises the concern that models which impose homo-
geneity in the adjustment of in￿ ation through out time could be mis-speci￿ed.
Knowing that adjustment around the breaks is of a di⁄erent nature than
adjustments in normal times is very useful insofar as it avoids overrating or
underestimating the response of in￿ ation. For instance, a few recent studies
of univariate models of in￿ ation stress that allowing for breaks in the mean of
in￿ ation reduces the estimates of in￿ ation persistence (Levin and Piger 2004,
Benati, 2004, Gadzinski and Orlandi, 2004). In addition, Corvoiser and Mojon
(2004) show that breaks in the mean of in￿ ation generally (across 23 OECD
countries including the US) a⁄ect the speed of the response of in￿ ation to a
variety of nominal and real shocks. To the extent that breaks in the mean of
in￿ ation re￿ ect changes in policy regimes, one interpretation is that in￿ ation is
15
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sibly because in￿ ation expectations adjust sluggishly to the new policy regime
(Ball, 1994; Nicolae and Nolan, 2004; Corvoisier and Mojon, 2004). Therefore,
the next section will extend the evaluation of the e⁄ects of breaks in the mean
of in￿ ation from univariate models that encompass all types of shocks to the
analysis of monetary policy shocks alone.
3.2 Controlling for breaks in the VAR
3.2.1 Methodology
In addition to sub-sample estimates, which allow for changes in all the parame-
ters of the VARs, two other strategies for controlling the e⁄ects of breaks in the
mean of in￿ ation are possible12. The ￿rst strategy consists of estimating the
exact same VARs as discussed in section 2 while substituting the raw in￿ ation
series by "demeaned in￿ ation" (which ￿ uctuates around the zero line in Figure
1), i.e. the deviations of in￿ ation from its breaking mean. The second one is
to allow for changes in the intercepts of the VAR equations at the dates of the
breaks in the mean of in￿ ation.
I opt for the latter strategy because it nests the former, as it allows breaks in
the mean of the other variables of the VAR when the mean of in￿ ation breaks.
I ￿nd that breaks in the intercepts of the VAR equations are signi￿cant only for
the CPI in￿ ation, the Commodity price index in￿ ation and the growth rate of
total reserve, which is, perhaps surprisingly, smaller in the period between 1973
and 1982. Changes in the intercept of the in￿ ation equation are signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. Hence, breaks that are estimated with the Altissimo and
Corradi procedure and alternative break tests, which are based on the informa-
tion contained in the in￿ ation series only, are not due to the omission of some
variable to which the mean of in￿ ation would endogenously respond.
12Given the short span of data prior to 1967 and the proximity of breaks, this approch,
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controlling for the heteroskedasticity of the errors. The T-statistics of the breaks
in the intercept of the in￿ ation equations in 1967 Q3, 1973 Q1 and 1982 Q2 drop
respectively from 2.0, 2,7 and 3.8 in the OLS estimate to respectively 1.6, 2.1 and
3.6 when estimated with GLS controlling for heteroschedasticity of the errors
as in White (1980). Hence two of the three breaks remain signi￿cant at the
standard 5 % threshold while the ￿rst 1967 Q3 remains so only at the 12 %.
Altogether, this result contradicts somewhat the point of Primiceri (2005)
and Sims and Zha (2005) who both conclude that outside the changes in the
variance of the shocks, the VAR parameters are stable. My results indicate
instead that I cannot reject that the changes in the mean of US in￿ ation, as
dated thanks to the break tests presented above, are associated to statistically
signi￿cant changes in the intercept of the in￿ ation equation. This result also
con￿rms the graphical impression that the time series of in￿ ation has indeed
seen its mean changing in the 1970￿ s.
3.2.2 Results
Figure 4 compares the impulse response of the Federal funds rate, GDP growth,
in￿ ation and the price level in the CEE-99a with and without breaks in the
intercept of the model equations. The point estimate of the impulse responses
with breaks is the dashed line, while the full lines are similar to the standard
model showed in Figure 2. Figures A1 to A5 focus on the response of in￿ ation
and the price level for the four other VARs13. There again, the point estimate
of the model with breaks is compared to the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of
1000 Monte Carlo simulations of the model without breaks.
The breaks in the mean of in￿ ation a⁄ect mostly the impulse response of
in￿ ation. The latter is close or above the 10th percentile of the IRF of in￿ ation
13For this exercise, I also report estimates of a VAR where instead of the interest rate on
Federal Funds, I use the Boschen and Mills index of monetary policy tightness. This model
cannot however be estimated for the post 1984 sample because the Boschen and Mills index
has not been updated after 1995. See the presentation of this model in the appendix.
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even much sharper contrast between the VAR model ignoring the breaks and
the model controlling for them.14 15
What do these results imply?
First, the impact of including breaks corroborates the view that there may
be indeed discontinuous adjustments of in￿ ation including in its response to
unsystematic monetary policy. It is remarkable that only 3 degrees of freedom
have such a large impact on the shape and magnitude of the responses of in￿ ation
and the price level. Second, that the omission of breaks result in a larger
response of in￿ ation is at least suggestive that breaks in the mean of US in￿ ation
are monetary policy phenomena. It seems that the response of in￿ ation as it
is measured in the literature is capturing these very persistent changes in the
mean of in￿ ation. In other words, our result is consistent with unsystematic
monetary policy having contributed to the shifts toward higher and then lower
levels of in￿ ation that took place around the break dates. This view is actually
reinforced by plotting together the breaks in the mean of in￿ ation and the
moving average of order 5 of the exogenous monatery policy shocks (see Figure
5)16. It is clear that the 1982 drop in the mean of in￿ ation was preceded by
a tightening of monetary policy between a sample low in 1975 to the sample
pick in 1981. Likewise, the 1967 and 1973 breaks occur at a period when the
tightness of monetary policy is trending down.
Third, the response of in￿ ation to unsystematic monetary policy is not sig-
ni￿cant outside the period of the breaks in the mean of in￿ ation. This does not,
however, imply that systematic monetary policy has no e⁄ect on in￿ ation. Ac-
14Although the point estimates of the in￿ation and the price level responses may actually
increase (Figure 4 and A1 to A5), these increases are typically not signi￿cant.
15Using a similar approach on respectively the 1974-2005 and the 1960-1981 sub-samples
showed that controling respectively for the the 1982 break alone or both the 1967 and 1973
breaks had the same consequence of reducing dramatically the response of in￿ation and the
price level to monetary policy shocks. Results, which are not reported for the sake of space,
are available upon request.
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the estimated monetary policy rule. My estimates of this policy rule/reaction
function are such that the policy interest rate has a positive response to in￿ ation
and GDP growth, and so in both models (with and without breaks). It may still
be the case that systematic monetary policy stabilizes in￿ ation. However, on
average, the deviations of the interest rate from the policy rule, which are "or-
thogonal" to other shocks and therefore identi￿able, had no impact on in￿ ation
once we control for a few shifts in the mean of in￿ ation.
To summarize, unsystematic monetary policy, which is de￿ned in the VAR as
deviations from the monetary policy rule, has a much smaller e⁄ect on in￿ ation
than is usually thought, except at the three occasions when the mean of in￿ ation
changed. It therefore appears that much of the response of in￿ ation in the
model that ignores such breaks comes from the rare and large adjustments of
US in￿ ation around the dates identi￿ed by the break tests. Even if we do
not take these break tests literally, the estimates that I reported here point to
instability of the response of in￿ ation to monetary policy shocks.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that the hump shape response of US in￿ ation which is ob-
tained with VAR based identi￿cation and considered a stepping stone of the
development stuctural models is not robust. In particular, the post 1984 ex-
perience is one where VAR estimated money supply shocks have no signi￿cant
e⁄ect on in￿ ation and the response of the price level is ￿ at.
Second, the paper suggests that the typical hump shape response is actually
picking up the large and persistent adjustments that took place around the
Great In￿ ation of the 1970￿ s. This is why, controlling for shifts in the mean
of in￿ ation radically reduces the VAR-based measures of the response of US
in￿ ation to unsystematic monetary policy. Once these shifts are ￿ltered out,
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December 2005This change in the response of in￿ ation points to time variation in the e⁄ects
of monetary policy. Outside periods of large and persistent adjustments, the
VARs based measures of non-systematic monetary policy do not a⁄ect in￿ ation.
While this result may simply re￿ ect some limitations of the VAR methodology,
it nevertheless establishes a new benchmark stylized fact for the calibration of
macroeconometric models of the US business cycle.
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December 2005Appendix: An overview of the ￿ve alternative
identi￿cations used in the paper
Models and identi￿cation
a) Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999)
See section 2 of the main text.
Our vector of variables is Y t with Y t0 = (dyt;￿t;￿CP
t ;it;dTRt;dNBRt;dM1t):
See the next section for the de￿nition and source of the variables.
In the paper we refer to estimates of this model estimated both with quar-
terly and monthly data. In the latter case, dyt is measured by industrial pro-
duction.
b) Gordon and Leeper (1994)
The second model is based on an identi￿cation procedure proposed by Gor-
don and Leeper (1994). This model adds a long-term (ten-year) interest rate
and substitute M2 to M1, while measure of reserves are excluded. Gordon and
Leeper opt for an alternative set of identifying restrictions that focus on the in-
formation that the central bank could be expected to have at the time of setting
the short-term interest rate. Accordingly, contemporaneous observations on in-
￿ ation and GDP cannot in￿ uence this decision￿ leaving only contemporaneous
commodity prices, the long-term interest rate, and M2 as potentially a⁄ecting
the contemporaneous Federal funds rate. In contrast, contemporaneous prices
and GDP components enter the "private sector driven" money demand equa-
tion. Here I slightly modify this identi￿cation by allowing the long-term interest
rate to react to contemporaneous innovation in the federal funds rate.
The vector of variables is given by: Y t0 = (dyt;￿t;￿CP
t ;lt;it;dM2t)
We estimate the money supply and the money demand shocks by imposing
zero contemporaneous restrictions as follows:
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c) Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001)
The third model is taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
This model includes consumption, investment, GDP, the CPI, a real wage vari-
able, a labor productivity measure, real corporate pro￿ts, the federal funds rate,
M2 growth, and the Standard and Poor￿ s 500 stock price index de￿ ated by the
CPI.
The model￿ s vector of variables is








t ;it;d(PY ￿ WH)t;dM2t;dS&P500
t )
and the identi￿cation is recursive.
d) Giordani (2004)
In the fourth model, I follow Giordani (2004). This model uses capacity
utilization instead of GDP because it is a better approximation of the output
gap that enters the reaction function of the Federal Reserve. Giordani (2004)
shows both in a simple theoretical model and in a simple 3 variables estimated
VAR model (capacity utilization, in￿ ation and the Federal funds rate) that the
price puzzle is very much attenuated with respect to models using GDP as the
measure of real activity.
The model includes (CAP_U:t;￿t;it), which respectively stand for Capacity
Utilization, dlog(CPI) and the FFR.
The identi￿cation is recursive.
e) Boschen and Mills (1995) inspired VAR
We simply replace the 3 monetary policy variables of the CEE-99a model,
i.e. FFR, total reserves and non-borrowed reserves with the Boschen and Mills
index of monetary tightness.
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t ;lt;BSIt;dM2t)
The identi￿cation is recursive.
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December 2005Data de￿nition and notation
De￿nition Notation
Federal funds rate it
Log(GDPt/GDPt￿1) dyt
Log(CPIt/CPIt￿1) ￿t






Bond interest rate lt










Log(Pro￿tst/Pro￿tst￿1) d(PY ￿ WH)t
Log(Stock pricest/Stock pricest￿1) dS&P500
t
Capacity Utilistation CAP_U:t
Boschen and Mill Index BSIt
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Interest Rates: Federal Funds Rate, (% P.A.); Fed H15 and 10-Year Con-
stant Maturity Securities, (% P.A.); Fed H15
Monetary aggregates: M1 and M2, (SA Billions $);Fed H.6 Money Stock
and Liquid Assets, and Debt Measures
Reserves: Nonborrowed reserves adjusted for changes in reserve require-
ments, (Mil. $, SA) and Total reserves adjusted for changes in reserve require-
ments, (Mil. $, SA);FRB: Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions - H.3
Economic activity: GDP in billions of chained 2000 dollars, BEA; Capac-
ity Utilization: Manufacturing - SIC, (% Capacity, SA);Federal Reserve Board,
G.17; Industrial Production: Total index, (Index 1997=100, SA), Federal Re-
serve Board, G.17
Prices: CPI: Urban Consumer - All items, (1982-84=100, SA), BLS; KR-
CRB Futures Price Index, (1967=100);Knight-Ridder, Commodity Index Re-
port
Wages: Avg. Hrly Earnings: Total Private, ($ Per Hrs., SA);Bureau of
Labor Statistics: Form 790, P is the CPI above.
Productivity: Productivity & Costs: Nonfarm Business - Output Per Hour
All persons, (Index 1992 = 100);BLS: Productivity & Costs
Pro￿ts: Corporate pro￿ts with inventory valuation and capital consump-
tion adjustments; Non ￿nancial (row 4); Survey of Current Business: Table 6.16
b,c and d; BEA
S&P Stock Price Index: 500 Composite, (Index 1941-43=10, Monthly Av-
erage);Standard & Poors: Security Price Index Record
All data are downloadable from www.bea.gov and www.freelunch.com and
the web page of Boschen and Mills for their index of monetary policy tightness.
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Source: Corvoisier and Mojon Appendix Table A2
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December 2005Figure 1a: Time series of selected US macroeconomic variables
in percents
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Figure 1b: Time series of selected US macroeconomic variables
in percents
Non-Borrowed reserves growth rate
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Figure 2: Effects of monetary policy when estimated for the 1960-2005 sample period
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December 2005Figure 3: Effects of monetary policy, estimates for the 1984-2005 period
CEE-99a model, 4 lags; 10 th 50th and 90th percentiles of the impulse responses
percent dev from base line
FFR
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December 2005Figure 4: Controlling for changes in the intercepts at break dates
1960-2005; dotted lines, which correspond to constant intercepts, are similar to Figure 2
percent dev from base line
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December 2005Figure 5: MA(5) of the CEE-99 monetary policy shocks and mean of inflation
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December 2005Figure A1: Effects of MP shocks in three versions of the monthly model
1984:1 to 2005:8 (full line); 1960:1 to 2005:8 without (broken line) and with changes in intercepts (dotted lines)
percent dev from base line
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December 2005Figure A2: Effects of MP shocks in three versions of the GL model
1984:1 to 2005:8 (full line); 1960:1 to 2005:8 without (broken line) and with changes in intercepts (dotted lines)
percent dev from base line
FFR
Quarters
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December 2005Figure A3: Effects of MP shocks in three versions of the CEE-01 model
1984:1 to 2005:8 (full line); 1960:1 to 2005:8 without (broken line) and with changes in intercepts (dotted lines)
percent dev from base line
FFR
Quarters
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Figure A4: Effects of MP shocks in three versions of the Giordani model
1984:1 to 2005:8 (full line); 1960:1 to 2005:8 without (broken line) and with changes in intercepts (dotted lines)
percent dev from base line
FFR
Quarters
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Figure A5: Effects of MP shocks in two versions of the BM95 model
1960:1 to 1995:4 without (broken line) and with changes in intercepts (dotted lines)
percent dev from base line
Boshen-Mills_ind
Quarters
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